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BQD-M-9

FOR CONSIDERATION AT OCTOBER 25 MEETING OF MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE

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SUBJECT: Air Access Announcements

ADN 11/1/75
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The Military Subcommittee at its October 13 meeting requested the Air Access Subgroup to re-examine the situation with respect to announcements or public statements, including the draft French governmental declaration (BQD-M-7), which might be required in the event of the air access contingencies described in the Air Access Status Report (BQD-M-8). The views of the Subgroup are as follows:

Recommendations:

1. That, in the event the Military Subcommittee approves this memorandum, it be transmitted to governments and General Norstad for their comments.

2. That, in the event governments approve the memorandum, the quadripartite representatives of the Ambassadorial Group should individually pass it to their respective Ambassadors in Bonn and the FRG for further action in coordination with General Norstad.

Applicable Considerations:

A. Procedures.

1. Because the Status Report is a summary compilation of directives, some elaboration of its description of announcements is desirable.

2. In view of the importance of the actions to which these announcements relate, they should be issued by governments. Bearing in mind, however, the rapidity with which air access contingencies may arise and the desirability of a prompt response to avoid giving the impression of tripartite irresolution, it is advisable that the announcements should be made on behalf of governments by the three Ambassadors in Bonn who are close to the anticipated scene of action and have good communications with the parties concerned.

3. Theoretically, it would be desirable for the Ambassadorial Group to prepare in advance texts of announcements for use in contingencies. There are a number of practical difficulties, however, in this procedure, especially the large number of possible contingencies. Therefore, the wiser course of action would seem to be to furnish the three Ambassadors in Bonn with appropriate guidelines which they would use in preparing a particular announcement after a contingency arises. This procedure provides for appropriate policy guidance from governments while giving flexibility in implementation. If time permits, an announcement could be reviewed by governments, but in any case response to Soviet/GDR actions should not be delayed pending governmental clearance of the exact text of an announcement.

4. As the Air Access Status Report clearly indicates, there

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remain important quadripartite divergencies on tripartite implementation of air contingency plans. These divergencies, of course, will complicate the preparation and possible implementation of agreed tripartite announcements in this field. This situation also affects the unresolved question of whether the announcements should be issued jointly or as announcements by individual governments.

B. Substance and Timing of Announcements

1. Re Contingency 3(a) of the Status Report, the U.K. and the US plan to issue a statement after the suspension of normal civil flights if this occurs in circumstances when the flights are deemed unsafe or impractical for one or more airlines but before a civil or military transport is shot down or forced down by military action. Such an announcement would serve the purposes of: (1) reaffirming determination to maintain air access; (2) announcing that to this end governments have found it necessary to assume additional responsibilities; (3) informing the traveling public of the circumstances under which flights will be continued and the reasons therefore; (4) justifying the introduction of military crews on civil aircraft and defining the military status of the crews, and (5) putting the Soviets and East Germans on notice that the appropriate measures are being taken to ensure the safety of flights to Berlin, including as necessary in some cases military crews to fly civil air transport and the provision of fighter protection.

An announcement is not envisaged by the French Government before an actual incident has taken place which would justify the introduction of fighter aircraft and the application of JACK PINE rules of engagement, (i.e., plane intercepted, harassed, forced down or shot down).

2. Re Contingency 3(b) a separate statement is not necessary in this contingency but it will, of course, be necessary for the Ambassadors to confirm that in accordance with the previous statement fighter protection has been initiated.

3. Re Contingency 4, the four governments are agreed an announcement should be made in Bonn after a civil or military transport is shot down or forced down by military action. For the US and UK such a statement could be issued immediately after General Norstad has informed the three Ambassadors in Bonn and FRG that he has ordered the shift to a civil airlift by military transports. The French, after receiving this notice from General Norstad, would seek governmental approval for the action and the accompanying announcement.

An announcement of this nature, which would refer as appropriate to previous announcements, would serve to: (1) reaffirm tripartite

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determination to maintain air access; (2) make clear to the Soviets and East Germans that military flights will be assisted and protected if there are obstacles to their passage and/or they are harassed or attacked from the air.

4. Re Contingency 5 the US and UK do not contemplate a separate announcement before initiating a response to harassment or attack from the ground either by obstacles or AAA fire since they consider the announcement described in para 3 above would suffice for this purpose. It will be appropriate, however, for the Ambassadors in Bonn to confirm that the countermeasures put into effect have been taken to achieve the objectives as previously stated in announcements. The French, after taking a governmental decision to destroy balloons in the Berlin Control Zone which could not be flown around, envisage a separate announcement to indicate the contemplated response and the reasons for it.

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